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I. INTRODUCTION
Soldiers' tort claims against the United States that are incident to military
service traditionally have been barred by what has come to be known as the
"Feres doctrine."' Recently, however, courts have made inroads to alleviate
the harsh results caused by this intramilitary immunity, most significantly
through the development of a "failure to warn" theory2 This Comment will
discuss the origin, theory, and ramifications of intramilitary immunity and the
effectiveness of a failure to warn analysis of soldiers' tort claims.
II. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTRAMILITARY IMMUNrrY
A. Governmental Immunity and the Federal Tort Claims Act
The doctrine of intramilitary immunity originated in the political theory
that kings were endowed with a divine right to rule and that therefore "the
King could do no wrong." 4 In the evolution of the modern republican state,
the government inherited the King's sovereign immunity. As a result, the
United States government cannot be sued without its own consent! In fact,
early in American jurisprudence Justice Marshall noted, "The universally
received opinion is, that no suit can be commenced or prosecuted against the
United States ....
Prior to the adoption of a statutory right to bring suit, relief from this
harsh doctrine was sought through private petitions that were addressed to
Congress and that prayed for consent to commence suits against the United
States government. Increasing numbers of petitions, however, made the in-
dividual petition method an inefficient mechanism for monitoring disputes and
one that was characterized by the capricious adjudication of tort claims against
the government.
7
1. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
2. See Broudy v. United States, 661 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1981); Schwartz v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 536
(E.D. Pa. 1964), affd, 381 F.2d 627 (3d Cir. 1967); Everett v. United States, 492 F. Supp. 318 (S.D. Ohio 1980);
Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979). For a case challenging the underlying policy factors
governing the Feres doctrine, see Hinkie v. United States, 524 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Pa. 1981). Contra Monaco v.
United States, 661 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1981); In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 506 F. Supp. 762
(E.D.N.Y. 1980).
3. While a "privilege" defense avoids tort liability according to the circumstances of the particular case,
an "'immunity" bars tort liability in all circumstances. Immunities are conferred because of the defendant's
status. An immunity defense does not deny the tortious conduct; it merely discounts liability. W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 970 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as W. PROSSER].
4. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950); W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 131, at 970-71.
5. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950); W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 131, at 971.
6. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821).
7. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 (1950).
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In response to the need for a more efficient method to resolve disputes
against the government, Congress passed the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA),8 which waives governmental immunity from tort claims under
certain circumstances.9 The FTCA provides that
the United States District Court... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil
actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and
after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission oc-
curred. 10
Congress, however, placed several limitations on the right to sue. For ex-
ample, the FTCA requires that before a tort claim can be adjudicated it must
be "presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency."" Moreover, the
government cannot be liable for punitive damages under the FTCA 2
Congress further limited its general consent to tort claims by providing
numerous exceptions. Immunity prevails, for example, against claims based
on injuries that result from an agency's or employee's performance of a dis-
cretionary function or duty or from combatant activities of military or naval
forces during war, or that arise in foreign countries. 3 Despite these excep-
tions, Congress was willing to extend the term "employee of the govern-
ment. . acting within the scope of his office or employment' ' 14 to include
"members of the military or naval forces of the United States... acting in
[the] line of duty."' 5 Thus, the military clearly could be held liable under the
FTCA for tortious acts not otherwise exempted. The Feres doctrine created
just such an exemption.
B. The Feres Doctrine
1. Background
Although the FTCA grants district courts jurisdiction over tort claims
against the United States, the Act does not specify which types of tort claims
the courts should recognize. 6 The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of
tort claims against the military in 1949 in Brooks v. United States.'7 While on
8. Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, ch. 753, tit. IV, 60 Stat. 812 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402,
1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-2680 (1976)).
9. See text accompanying note 13 infra.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
11. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2675(a), 2401(b). Cf. Annot., 13 A.L.1L Fed. 762 (1972 & Supp. 1981) (collecting § 2675(a)
cases).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976).
13. Id. § 2680 (1976).
14. Id. § 1346(b) (1976).
15. Id. § 2671 (1976).
16. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140-41 (1950).
17. 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
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furlough, the petitioner in Brooks was negligently killed by a government
employee. 8 The Court held that the FTCA permitted servicemen to bring tort
claims against the government if the claims were not incident to military
service. The Court, observing that the FICA granted the district courts juris-
diction over any claims founded on the alleged negligence of the United
States, was "not persuaded that 'any claim' means 'any claim but that of
servicemen." '"9 The Court noted in dicta, however, that "a wholly different
case" would have been presented had Brooks' accident been incident to his
military career.2
This "wholly different case" was presented to the Supreme Court the
following year in Feres v. United States.2' In Feres, the Court was confronted
with the question of whether the right to bring a tort action against the United
States under the FICA applies to negligence allegations that originated in
military service. The plaintiff alleged that the United States negligently
housed servicemen in unsafe barracks, an action that led to the decedent's
death in a fire. The Court also reviewed two companion cases, Jefferson v.
United States and Griggs v. United States. In Jefferson, the complainant
alleged that the government was liable for an army surgeon's negligent loss of
a towel in Jefferson's stomach during abdominal surgery. In Griggs, a serv-
iceman's executrix alleged that the decedent died as a result of unskilled
medical treatment by military surgeons.!
After reviewing the facts of each case, the Court held, "[he
Government is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to
servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity
incident to service." 23 The Court construed the FTCA as part of an entire
statutory scheme in which individuals could recover for the tortious conduct
of the government. The Court concluded that "[t]he primary purpose of the
Act was to extend a remedy to those who had been without; if it incidentally
benefited those already well provided for, it appears to have been uninten-
tional. "24 The Court apparently concluded that since each soldier could have
received benefits from the Veterans' Administration, he would be sufficiently
compensated for his service-related injuries and therefore would not need the
tort remedy?5
18. Id. at 50.
19. Id. at 51.
20. Id. at 52. The Court noted that a battle commander's poor judgment or an army surgeon's negligent slip
of hand would pose a different liability issue. Accordingly, the Court stated that the accident and injuries were
not "caused by [his] service except in the sense that all human events depend upon what has already tran-
spired." Id.
21. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
22. Id. at 137.
23. Id. at 146.
24. Id. at 140.
25. Id. at 140, 145. A recent ruling from a regional Veterans' Administration office indicates that the
Administration will not compensate veterans for exposure to nuclear radiation if the injury is diagnosed after the
presumptive period allowed by law, even if a post-discharge warning was not given. Letter from Veterans'
Adminstration to Charles Turgett (October 29, 1981). This denial seems to open the door to governmental
immunity in failure to warn cases. See text accompanying note 98 infra.
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The Court in Feres further reasoned that the relationship between the
military and the government ought to continue to be governed by federal
law. 26 In this vein, the Court concluded that the FTCA was not intended to
create "a new cause of action dependent on local law for service-connected
injuries or death due to negligence." ' 27 Also apparent in the Court's decision
was its recognition of the unique nature of the soldier's relationship to the
alleged tortfeasor. In distinguishing Brooks the Court stated, "This Court
rejected the contention [of a bar to liability], primarily because Brooks' rela-
tionship while on leave was not analogous to that of a soldier injured while
performing duties under orders. 28 Thus, the Court identified three reappear-
ing concerns that justified its exception: alternative compensation, applicabil-
ity of federal law, and the need to maintain military order.
2. Reaffirmation of Feres
The Supreme Court in Feres acknowledged that it may have miscon-
strued the purposes of the FTCA, especially given the lack of discussion in
the committee reports and floor debates to aid its interpretation.29 Amidst this
uncertainty the Court concluded, "[I]f we misinterpret the Act... Congress
possesses a ready remedy.""a Congress, however, did not act in this regard.
Accordingly, when the Supreme Court had the opportunity to review the
Feres doctrine recently in Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States,
3
'
it reaffirmed the military exception to the FTCA.
3 2
The Supreme Court in Stencel summarized several reasons for the con-
tinuing applicability of the Feres doctrine. First, the Court pointed out that
intramilitary immunity preserves the distinctively federal character of the
relationship between the government and the soldier.33 The Court suggested
that the tort liability of the federal military should not depend on the laws of
the state where the tort occurred. Second, the Court opined that veterans'
benefits already provide compensation and ought to serve as an upper limit of
liability.34 Last, it determined that permitting suits by servicemen for injuries
received while on duty would have an adverse impact on military discipline.
35
26. 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
27. Id.
28. Id. See United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954) (Court explicitly recognized military's interest
in discipline); cf. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) ("[Flundamental necessity for obedience, and the
consequent necessity for imposition of discipline, may render permissible within the military that which would
be constitutionally impermissible outside it.").
29. 340 U.S. 135, 138 (1950).
30. Id.
31. 431 U.S. 666 (1977). In Stencel, a National Guard pilot was injured by an ejection system that malfunc-
tioned. The guardsman sued the manufacturer of the system, who in turn sought indemnity from the United
States government. The Court affirmed the Feres doctrine and did not grant the indemnification. Id. at 674.
32. Id. at 670-72.
33. Id. at 672.
34. Id. at 673.
35. Id.
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Thus the Court has formalized the Feres decision and in so doing has asserted
that an intramilitary immunity is essential for incidents related to military
service."
III. PENETRATING INTRAMILITARY IMMUNITY
A. Classifying Attacks on Intramilitary Immunity
The Feres doctrine, as reaffirmed in Stencel, has been subject to much
academic and judicial comment and criticism.37 In the various attempts to
avoid the Feres bar,3 8 plaintiffs have urged, with varying success, three ex-
ceptions to the doctrine:3 9 (1) a "continuing tort" theory, which permits re-
covery if the single negligent act occurred while the individual was in the
service and the effects of the initial act have lingered after discharge; (2) a
"separate negligent acts" theory, which applies if the military has performed
two negligent acts, one that occurred while the individual was in the service
and a second that was inflicted by the military after the individual had attained
civilian status; and (3) a "failure to warn" theory, which allows recovery if
the military has committed "an intentional act and then negligently fail[ed] to
36. Id. at 672-73. However, in a recent case, Hinkie v. United States, 524 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Pa. 1981), a
federal district court examined the three principles underlying the Feres "incident to military service" test and
held that an action brought by an injured veteran's family alleging birth defects in a child that were caused by
chromosomal alterations to the veteran would not be barred by Feres. Rather than automatically applying the
Feres doctrine, which would view the damage to family members as incident to military service, see In re
"Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 506 F. Supp. 762, 781 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), the court reasoned that
"this oversimplification would avoid the necessary analysis of policies underlying the Feres doctrine which the
Supreme Court requires in determining its application to novel cases." 524 F. Supp. 277, 282 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
The court's evaluation of the policies underlying the immunity doctrine revealed that on the facts presented
(1) no distinctly federal relationship existed between the plaintiff family and the United States, (2) veterans'
benefits may not compensate chromosomal damages under the basic entitlement of 38 U.S.C. § 331 (1976), and
(3) because of the lapse of time before the action was brought, no undermining of discipline would occur. Id. at
282-84.
Clearly, the court's analysis of policy factors overriding a strict interpretation of "incident to military
service" leaves little of the Feres doctrine as a bar to a suit by the veteran's family against the government. It
should also be noted that since the children have become the necessary parties for such an action, the claim
exists only for the families of those veterans who had children with genetic defects. A veteran who refrained
from having children because he was warned of such genetic dangers would not be able to recover for the
damage to himself.
37. See Note, From Feres to Stencel: Should Military Personnel Have Access to FTCA Recovery?, 77
MiCH. L. REV. 1099 (1979). The article calls for the abolishment of the Feres doctrine. Its author recommends
that in lieu of Feres the discretionary exception to the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), be used as the test to
determine whether a claim could penetrate intramilitary immunity. The author advocates replacing the incident
to service test with an inquiry into whether the claim either arose from a policy decision of the military, in which
case the immunity would prevail, or concerned the operational activities of the military, in which case a cause of
action could be stated. Id. at 1122-23. The author intended to preserve the policy behind the Feres doctrine
while attempting to mitigate its harshness and therefore argued that courts ought to take into account the
following: whether the injury arose due to a decision requiring professional judgment, whether there are
significant disciplinary reasons to bar a claim, whether an applicable military regulation prescribes a standard of
conduct, and whether the injury arose due to an emergency that would justify a lesser standard of care. Id. at
1123-25.
38. For a good discussion of the types ofcases that arise in the area of intramilitary immunity, see generally
Annot., 31 A.L.R. Fed. 146 (1977).
39. Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344, 352 (D.D.C. 1979) (mem.). This division, which will be
employed throughout this analysis, was originally used by Judge Richey in Thornwell to explain and predict how
courts will pigeon-hole various claims against the military.
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protect the soldier turned civilian from the dire consequences which flow
from the original wrong.'"'4 Typically, courts have not permitted recovery
based on a "continuing tort" theory4) ' but have permitted inroads into intra-
military immunity based on the "separate negligent acts" theory42 and on the
"failure to warn" theory.
43
1. Continuing Tor
A "continuing tort" theory, best characterized by Feres and its progeny,
has failed to penetrate the intramilitary immunity.4 Since the Feres test for
intramilitary immunity is "whether plaintiff's injuries have as their genesis
injuries allegedly sustained incident to the performance of military service, ' 45
courts have rejected the view that an injury does not occur until its manifesta-
tions become apparent.6 Under a continuing tort analysis, injuries that can be
traced to the service are not compensable, even if the injuries do not manifest
themselves until after a person has attained civilian status. Like a single tort, a
continuing tort can be viewed as one that extends from the military into the
civilian life of an individual. However, it is doubtful whether the theory and
policy underpinning the Feres bar to recovery are amenable to a continuing
tort problem.47
2. Separate Negligent Acts
In United States v. Browne the plaintiff successfully argued that a separ-
ate negligent act created an inroad to intramilitary immunity. The plaintiff-
40. Id. This Comment will not discuss the various single tort theories that have evolved to deal with cases
in which the tort is incident to military service. Courts have had little problem in dismissing these claims under
the rubric of Feres. For example, in Uptegrove v. United States, 600 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1044 (1980), the court barred the plaintiffs claim that the decedent was killed in a plane in which he had
reserved a military space seat. Since the injury was sustained incident to service, no recovery was permitted. Id.
at 1251. In Citizens Nat'l Bank v. United States, 594 F.2d 1154, 1157 (7th Cir. 1979), the court refused recovery
to a serviceman who was attacked by marine guards.
41. See note 44 infra.
42. See note 48 infra.
43. See note 51 infra.
44. See, e.g., Henning v. United States, 446 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972);
Sigler v. Levan, 485 F. Supp. 185 (D. Md. 1980); Monaco v. United States, C-79-0859, slip op. (N.D. Cal. Nov.
2, 1979), affd, 661 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1981).
45. Monaco v. United States, No. C-79-0859, slip op. at 3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 1979), affd, 661 F.2d 129
(9th Cir. 1981). In Monaco, the plaintiff-father attempted to circumvent the Feres doctrine by arguing that his
cancer, which manifested itself some thirty years after his original exposure to radiation while in the service,
was not incident to service since it was not discovered until the plaintiff had become a civilian. The court,
however, decided that since the cancer stemmed from his original exposure to radiation in the service, it was
incident to service and hence barred by Feres. Id. The Ninth Circuit reluctantly affirmed the application of the
Feres doctrine, noting that the doctrine had been consistently applied to prevent courts from examining negli-
gent acts of the military. 661 F.2d 129, 131 (9th Cir. 1981). Nevertheless, the court seemed uncomfortable with
the resulting inequity-denial of relief to a child born with birth defects caused by the genetic alteration that
resulted from her father's exposure to radiation in service. Id. at 134.
46. 661 F.2d 129, 131 (9th Cir. 1981).
47. For example, permitting a civilian to recover under a continuing tort theory does not pose the threat to
military discipline that has been said to support intramilitary immunity. See Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v.
United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977). It can be argued, however, that any liability for military acts will
necessarily interfere with military discipline. Id; see also notes 25 and 37 supra.
48. 348 U.S. 110 (1954); see also Hungerford v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1961), rev'd on
other grounds, 307 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1962).
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respondent had been discharged from the service as a result of an injury he
received due to the military's negligence. After his release, Brown suffered a
second injury: a Veterans' Administration hospital's negligent application of a
defective tourniquet. The Supreme Court did not bar Brown's recovery, be-
cause the second negligent act had occurred while Brown was a civilian and
was found not to be incident to military service 9 The Court indicated that
Brown was no longer on active duty nor subject to military discipline; there-
fore, the rationale behind the Feres bar to recovery was absent 0
3. Failure to Warn
The "failure to warn" theory is a hybrid of the "continuing tort" and
"separate tort" analyses. The theory permits plaintiffs to recover on the
ground that the military owes a certain duty of care to veterans if it intention-
ally and harmfully exposed them to dangerous substances while they were in
the service." While the Feres doctrine still effectively bars a veteran's re-
covery for the original harmful exposure that was incident to the service,
under the failure to warn theory liability attaches to the military when its
failure to warn a veteran aggravates the original wrong by increasing the
danger over time or by causing the veteran to believe that the danger has been
removed
52
Because some courts have held that a failure to warn following discharge
is incident to service and barred by Feres, the failure to warn theory must be
distinguished from a continuing tort.53 To be successful, the plaintiff apparent-
ly must assert a failure to warn along the lines of United States v. Brown;54
that is, he must show that two distinct torts occurred: one while in the service,
the other after discharge
55
The origin of this duty to warn is relatively recent. Historically, a duty to
warn did not exist since no liability attached for nonfeasance.5 6 Later in the
49. 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954). Arguably, if Brown had not injured his leg in the service, there would have
been no need for the subsequent operation at the Veterans' Administration hospital. The Court, however, chose
not to view the claim as a continuing tort since there was not a direct connection between the original injury and
the subsequent application of the tourniquet and the injury was one normally compensable under the Tort
Claims Act. Id.
50. Id. The court relied on Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49,52 (1949), in which the Supreme Court had
held that the intramilitary immunity did not apply when injuries were not caused by service-related incidents.
51. See Broudy v. United States, 661 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1981); Schwartz v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 536
(E.D. Pa. 1964), affd, 381 F.2d 627 (3d Cir. 1967); Everett v. United States, 492 F. Supp. 318 (S.D. Ohio 1980);
Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979) (memorandum opinion).
52. See text accompanying notes 61-87 infra.
53. See Henning v. United States, 446 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972). In
Henning, the alleged misreadings of X-rays occurred while the plaintiff was in the service. The failure to warn
Henning of the correct interpretation of the X-rays in the months following his discharge was deemed incident to
service. Thus, the Feres doctrine struck down the claim as a continuing tort.
54. 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
55. Broudy v. United States, 661 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1981). InBroudy, the court permitted aveteran to prove
post-discharge negligence but cautioned that had the government learned of the problems with radiation ex-
posure while Broudy was still in the hospital, the failure to warn would have been incident to service and
therefore barred by Feres. Id. at 128-29. Application of the bar in the latter case could lead to an absurdity: the
government would have to argue that the military knew that the radiation was dangerous and decided not to
warn. By thus showing more reprehensible conduct, the government can avail itself of the Feres umbrella.
56. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 56 at 338.
1982]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
development of the law of torts, however, courts held that certain relation-
ships raised a duty to take affirmative action to protect others; custom, public
sentiment, and social policy determined which relationships raised that
duty.57 In a further refinement in cases in which the defendant's negligence
was responsible for the plaintiff's predicament, the courts established a con-
structive relationship by which the defendant had an additional duty of giving
assistance that would help the plaintiff avoid further harm. In fact, this duty
was recognized even when the defendant's prior conduct that caused the
predicament was innocent.58 Dean Prosser had argued that while the devel-
opment of the duty to warn has been slow and cautious,
there is reason to think that it may continue until it approaches a general holding
that the mere knowledge of serious peril, threatening death or great bodily harm to
another, which an identified defendant might avoid with little inconvenience,
creates a sufficient relation, recognized by every moral and social standard, to
impose a duty of action.
59
The Restatement (Second) of Torts similarly recognizes the duty to take
affirmative action (which includes warning). Section 322 of the Restatement
provides that
if the actor knows or has reason to know that by his conduct, whether tortious or
innocent, he has caused such bodily harm to another as to make him helpless and
in danger of further harm, the actor is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to
prevent such further harm.60
Intramilitary immunity is not consistent with either the Restatement's or
Dean Prosser's view of the duty to warn. Since the relationship of the military
to the soldier still in the service is characterized by the latter's dependency
and lack of free choice, it would be a rather harsh doctrine that disavowed any
obligation to a veteran. When the military has knowledge of the potentially
lingering effects of a dangerous exposure of a serviceman, the moral and just
result of warning the serviceman outweighs any inconvenience to government
that may accompany such a duty. Within this apparent framework, several
courts have adopted the failure to warn theory to avoid the Feres bar.
B. Application of the Failure to Warn Theory to the Military
1. Schwartz v. United States
In Schwartz v. United States6' the plaintiff was treated for sinusitis
while serving in the Navy. A radioactive dye, umbrathor, was used as a
contrast dye for purposes of the X-rays. Schwartz continued to experience
57. Id. at 339.
58. Id. at 342. Thus, it will be shown that while initial acts of negligence by the military are subject to an
immunity according to Feres, the military has a subsequent duty to warn a veteran.
59. Id. at 343.
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 322 (1965).
61. 230 F. Supp. 536 (E.D. Pa. 1964), aff d, 381 F.2d 627 (3d Cir. 1967).
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sinus problems following his medical discharge in 1945. When Schwartz went
to a veterans' hospital for follow-up treatment, doctors at the hospital failed to
send for his medical records, which would have revealed that Schwartz had
been previously exposed to a chemical that had since been discovered to
cause cancer. By the time doctors discovered the cancer, the plaintiff had lost
an eye as well as his voice. Because a claim based on negligent treatment
would have been barred by Feres, Schwartz based his claim on the govern-
ment's failure to warn him about the known dangers of umbrathor.62 The
court held that the military should have reviewed the records of all patients
who had been given umbrathor and warned them about the potentially del-
eterious condition posed by lingering amounts of the dye retained in their
bodies. The court concluded that "[t]he negligence here is not in its installa-
tion, but rather in not having affirmatively sought out those who had been
endangered after there was knowledge of the danger in order to warn them
that in the supposedly innocent treatment there had now been found to lurk
the risk of devastating injury." 63 The court thus held the Feres bar inapplic-
able: the duty to warn was breached by the continuing failure of military
doctors to notify patients who had been exposed to a known carcinogen!, By
avoiding a Feres conclusion, the court concluded that Schwartz's recovery
was not restricted to the $84,928 he received in veterans' benefits. The court
held that the Veterans' Administration payments only partially mitigated past
and future damages and awarded an additional $725,000 damages for future
medical cost, loss of wages, and pain and suffering.65
The Schwartz decision does not conflict on policy grounds with the
reasons typically employed by the courts to support the Feres decision.66 For
example, military discipline will not be endangered if a plaintiff has, like
Schwartz, attained civilian status. Second, Veterans' Administration benefits
would serve only to mitigate the damage recovery that the failure to warn tort
will provide. It should be noted that the Schwartz decision does no more than
restore to a plaintiff the right to trial by jury at the expense to govern-rnent of
weakening a blanket immunity and obviating some administrative decisions of
the Veterans' Administration.
2. Thornwell v. United States
A similar factual pattern arose some fifteen years later in Thornwell v.
United States.67 Thornwell brought charges against the government for
62. 230 F. Supp. 536, 537-40 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
63. Id. at 540.
64. Id. The court did not address the question of whether the duty to warn must arise after discharge, as
might be implied by Feres. Interestingly, the court pointed out that the dangers of umbrathor were noted long
before Schwartz left the service. Id. If this was the case, the duty to warn Schwartz arguably arose while he was
still in the service, and the result is thus seemingly inconsistent with Feres.
65. Id. at 542-43.
66. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
67. 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979) (mem.). Note, however, that in Schwartz the military's initial conduct
was apparently innocent (at most negligent), 230 F. Supp. 536, 538-40 (E.D. Pa. 1964); in Thornwell the
military's initial conduct was highly culpable, 471 F. Supp. 344, 351 (D.D.C. 1979).
1982]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
harassment, interrogation, imprisonment, and the covert administration of
drugs (most notably LSD) during his active military career. He also charged
the government with concealment and the failure to provide follow-up ex-
aminations and treatment after his military discharge. Citing the Feres doc-
trine, the court dismissed the claims for injuries sustained while Thormwell
was on active duty.69 The court, however, permitted Thornwell to bring suit
for those post-discharge injuries that were exacerbated by the lack of ad-
equate care and treatment afforded to Thornwell, the civilian, by the military.
This second act of negligence occurred after Thornwell attained civilian
status. Thus, he was able to avoid the Feres bar.70
The court also needed to distinguish the Thornwell case from a continuing
tort in which the negligent act occurs while the plaintiff is on duty and lingers
after discharge and in which recovery is barred by the Feres doctrine.7' In
rejecting the applicability of the doctrine of intramilitary immunity, the court
concluded, "[P]ost-discharge negligence involved a course of conduct distinct
and separate from the intentional wrongs which had occurred while he was on
active duty.", 72 As in Schwartz, the court was also able to distinguish its
decision from Feres because the rationale used to support the intramilitary
immunity was absent. For example, since Thornwell was no longer subject to
military discipline, the distinctively federal relationship between the military
and the soldier was not disturbed.73 Importantly, the court in Thornwell recog-
nized a potential difficulty with the failure to warn theory, that is, that artful
pleading must be closely scrutinized to ensure that a continuing act of negli-
gence was not arbitrarily divided into separate wrongs.74 Since the Thornwell
decision, courts have sought to distinguish claims arising from failure to warn
on their facts since this penetration of intramilitary immunity arguably could be
68. 471 F. Supp. 344, 346 (D.D.C. 1979). Thornwell also alleged that his constitutional rights had been
violated. This aspect of the case will not be discussed although the following language of the court should be
noted: "[I]f the military deprives a veteran of his constitutional rights, it may not look to Feres for immunity."
Id. at 353.
69. Id. at 347-48.
70. Id. at 349-53. The court cited United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 770 (1954), for the proposition that
Feres does not bar tort claims that are not incident to military service. Id. at 350. See text accompanying notes
48-50 supra.
71. 471 F. Supp. 344, 351 (D.D.C. 1979). Critically, the court found a second locus of facts in the plaintiffs
complaint to conclude that a separate duty of care both existed and was breached after the plaintiff left the
service. Id.
72. Id. at 353. It would have been more difficult for the court to distinguish between the two torts had the
court viewed the initial tort as negligence rather than an intentional tort. After all, negligent torts are likely to
overlap, thereby clouding the incident to service test. This overlap is clearly demonstrated in In re "Agent
Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 506 F. Supp. 762, 779 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), in which the court found that
since the exposure of soldiers to the defoliant "Agent Orange" in Vietnam was pursuant to a valid military
objective of defoliation, the military's acts were only negligent, and therefore its failure to warn did not present a
separate and distinct act of post-discharge negligence.
73. 471 F. Supp. 344, 350 (D.D.C. 1979).
74. Id. at 352.
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applicable in all instances in which the injuries do not manifest themselves until
after a soldier is discharged.75
3. Everett v. United States
A third case involving the failure to warn theory was Everett v. United
States.76 The executrix in Everett sued the United States government on
behalf of her deceased husband for injuries that he sustained as an enlisted
man in the Air Force. In 1953, Everett and other servicemen were ordered to
march through a nuclear blast area less than one hour after the detonation of a
bomb at Camp Desert Rock, Nevada. Everett claimed that the harmful doses
of radiation that her husband received as a result of this service experience
were the proximate cause of his death from cancer in 1977.
77
The court applied the Feres doctrine and denied Everett any recovery on
the plaintiff's claim that the defendant was guilty of reckless conduct.78 The
court noted that the rationale behind the Feres doctrine still applied to the
case at bar even though the degree of culpability was based on reckless or
intentional conduct rather than negligence. 79 The long judicial history of insul-
ating military affairs from judicial scrutiny mandated that even truly un-
pleasant service-related torts be barred by Feres.8' Thus, the court deter-
mined that intramilitary immunity would not be circumvented by any pleading
variations of a tort theme, so long as the tort was incident to service.8 '
The court, however, ruled that Everett had stated a cause of action based
on his claim "that the government was negligent in failing to warn the dece-
dent of the harmful effects of the radiation to which he was exposed."'2 The
court was influenced by Judge Richey's post-discharge negligence scheme
established in the Thornwell decision.83 Using Richey's third category, liabil-
ity for failure to warn the soldier-turned-civilian of the consequences of an
75. See, e.g., Schnurnan v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 429, 437 (E.D. Va. 1980). In Schnurman, the
plaintiff alleged injuries resulting from exposure to toxic war gas in a Navy experiment. Recovery for post-
discharge negligence was denied since the injuries "'were not shown to be caused in any way by the govern-
ment's failure to treat plaintiff after discharge or to warn him of the true nature of the gas to which he had been
exposed." Id. at 437. The plaintiff needed to show either that the injuries were aggravated by the failure to warn
or that follow-up treatment could have avoided long-term effects of the exposure. Id. The court distinguished
this case from Thornwell on the grounds that the initial act was not intentional since the plaintiffhad volunteered
for the experiment. Id. at 437.
76. 492 F. Supp. 318 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
77. Id. at 319.
78. Id. at 320.
79. Id. at 321. The court cited Stencel and noted that allowing liability to attach to the government would
have invaded the distinctively federal relationship between the military and the soldier, thus making liability
hinge on the law of the state in which the injury occurred. Id. Second, the court deemed Veterans' Adminstra-
tion benefits to be a type of "no-fault" compensation that was afforded to veterans without regard to a finding of
tort liability against the government. Id. Last, the court was reluctant to examine the propriety of military
decisions, an action that could subvert the discipline and authority needed in the military. Id.
80. Id. at 322.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 325. See also Broudy v. United States, 661 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1981).
83. 492 F. Supp. 318, 325 (S.D. Ohio 1980). See text accompanying note 39 supra.
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intentional act of the military, the court found that the failure to warn Everett
of the dire consequences that flowed from his military service was a separate
actionable wrong not barred by the Feres doctrine.ea
The reasoning of the Everett court is especially interesting, for the court
could have concluded that the duty to warn following Everett's discharge was
a duty that arose out of events incident to his military service.85 Instead the
court reasoned that the negligent failure to warn was distinguishable from the
Feres-barred willful tort involved in the initial experimentation.86 In keeping
with the two-tort analysis, the Everett court further demonstrated that the
failure to warn must enhance damages that could have been contained and
limited to the damage created by the initial exposure to the radiation!'
IV. ASSESSMENT OF THE FAILURE TO WARN THEORY AND
ITS IMPACT ON INTRAMILITARY IMMUNITY
A. Potential for Broad Implications
As the court noted in Everett, intramilitary liability will be severely chal-
lenged in the years to come as the deleterious effects of service-related ex-
posures to such things as defoliants, atomic radiation, and drugs manifest
themselves in the civilian lives of veterans. 88 In discussing the effects of past
atomic testing, for example, former Interior Secretary Stewart Udall com-
mented, "The problem is larger than anyone has thought-and more
tragic.", 89 The problem is further exacerbated since it takes anywhere from
five to thirty years for many cancers to develop. And, in the interim, it is
difficult to distinguish post-military exposures to carcinogenic agents from the
original military exposure.90 Thus, the potential liability is almost incalculable
if the Feres doctrine is limited significantly as suggested by the recent case
developments.
84. 492 F. Supp. 318, 325 (S.D. Ohio 1980). But see Kelly v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 356, 361 (E.D. Pa.
1981), in which the court held that cancer allegedly sustained from exposure to nuclear radiation while plaintiff
was in the Navy fell within the Feres doctrine since there was no essential difference between the failure to give
initial warning and failure to warn thereafter.
85. See, e.g., Henning v. United States, 446 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972);
Wisniewski v. United States, 416 F. Supp. 599 (E.D. Wis. 1976). By employing a broad reading of Feres, these
decisions view the failure to warn as part of the initial tort that was incident to service-a continuing tort
perspective.
86. 492 F. Supp. 318, 325-26 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
87. Id. It logically follows that separate torts ought to lead to separate injuries. Thus, if it could be
determined that the radiation exposure to Everett created "instant" cancer, there would have been no valid
second tort claim for failing to warn. Conversely, the decision reached by the court in Everett is a just one if a
warning could well have arrested the spread of Everett's cancer.
88. Id. at 320.
89. A Nuclear Danger Zone, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 1, 1979, at 27.
90. Id. The article reveals that the Atomic Energy Commission had knowledge of the harmful effects of
radiation as early as 1955. Local residents near a nuclear test site received a letter which stated, "At times, some
of you have been exposed to potential risks from flash or fallout." Id. The military's knowledge of the danger
makes its failure to warn soldiers or civilians like Everett of the possible repercussions of their exposures all the
more reprehensible. See also H. ROSENBERG, ATOMIC SOLDIERS ix, 57, 134, 139 (1980).
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The factual patterns of Schwartz, Thornwell, and Everett, however,
apparently persuaded the courts in those cases to make inroads into the
court-created Feres doctrine in order to reach a morally just and compelling
result. In fact, these decisions may mark the beginning of a judicial trend
toward dispensing with a continuing tort analysis that will bar recovery in
cases in which the moral ends justify permitting suit. By dispensing with the
often difficult determination of where one tort ends and another begins, the
failure to warn theory affords the veteran the same opportunity to sue under
the FTCA that his civilian counterpart has enjoyed.
Concommitantly, governmental liability based on the failure to warn will
force the military to inspect and update its records of the military history of
former soldiers. Moreover, attaching this liability to the military will subject
its actions to judicial review but will not affect disciplinary relations. In addi-
tion, courts will be in a position to assess whether certain Veterans'
Administration settlements mitigate damages for failure to warn and will
necessarily be forced to examine other facets of military decisions that have
managed to escape judicial review over the years. The job of balancing the
needs of the military with the needs of injured veterans-that is, just compen-
sation for their injuries-should belong to the courts, whose recognition of a
broadly construed duty to warn will make the military more accountable to its
veterans who have faithfully served their country.
B. Conformity with the Feres Perspective
Since the Feres doctrine has become somewhat entrenched in our law'9
it is crucial that the failure to warn theory comport with the logic and reason-
ing behind the Feres decision.92 Claimants must demonstrate that clever
pleading has not been used to disguise a tort that was actually "incident to
military service" and thus barred by Feres.93 In Everett, for example, this
objective was accomplished by distinguishing the initial tort of reckless
conduct from the second, negligent failure to warn. 94 Moreover, for the fail-
ure to warn theory to succeed, it must be shown that the duty to warn did not
arise until after the individual had left the service. 5 Thus, the plaintiff may
91. See Annot., 31 A.L.R. Fed. 146 (1977). While courts readily admit that intramilitary immunity is a
judicial interpretation of the FTCA, they are quick to point to tacit congressional approval of their decision:
Congress has neither amended the FTCA nor criticized the courts' interpretations. See text accompanying notes
30-32 supra; see also Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1981). But see Hinkie v. United States,
524 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (challenging application of the Feres doctrine to nonderivative claims of a
veteran's family).
92. See Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977). The courts have realized
that some aspects of the military's decisions must escape judicial review if the military is to be effective (e.g.,
combatant activities, planning, and strategy).
93. See note 72 supra.
94. 492 F. Supp. 318, 326 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
95. The court in Everett did not discuss when the military acquired knowledge of the harmful effects of its
action on servicemen. See note 55 supra.
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have to show that the duty to warn arose after discharge in order to escape the
continuing tort analysis of Feres.'
It is also necessary to show that even if failure to warn claims are distin-
guishable from Feres, the policies supported by the Feres bar will not be
undermined by the adoption of this new theory.97 To this end, since claimants
are civilians, this limited accountability of the military to the courts is argu-
ably less likely to undermine military discipline, especially in cases in which
many years have passed between actual military service and the manifestation
of the injury. Moreover, judicial review that examines whether a warning
should have been given, not whether the acts leading up to the need for the
warning were tortious, will not endanger military policy decisions. For ex-
ample, the court in Everett did not review the soundness of the policy of
human experimentation with atomic radiation. Instead, the court merely re-
viewed the military's post-discharge policy towards veterans. And the Feres
doctrine's assumption that the Veterans' Administration will provide suf-
ficient compensation is inapplicable in failure to warn cases; in some in-
stances there may be no compensation for this post-discharge negligence. 93
Hence, the integrity of Feres is preserved by this limited review.
Implicit in the Schwartz, Thornwell, and Everett decisions, however, is
the recognition that the courts retain the prerogative to construe the "incident
to service" test established in Feres. A broad reading of "incident to service"
would bar claims for failing to warn since there would have been no duty to
warn had the individual not been exposed to something harmful while in the
service. The policies that the Feres doctrine is designed to support, however,
do not require that the doctrine be defined so broadly that it prevents the
equitable results obtained in Schwartz, Thornwell, and Everett.
C. Utility as a Compromise Approach
The decisions that have employed a failure to warn theory as an inroad
into intramilitary immunity have effectively struck a compromise between the
view of courts that have chosen to bar all military claims by using a broad
reading of Feres and the view espoused by individuals who advocate the total
abandonment of intramilitary immunity. 9 Failure to warn theory still pre-
serves military autonomy; yet, it also restores veterans' right to sue under the
FTCA for some injuries, affirms the government's responsibility to those who
96. Claimants would do well to present their additional demand for damages for the failure to warn to the
proper administrative agency (Veterans' Administration), in order to show formally that the injuries that re-
sulted from the failure to warn were not compensated by the government and that judicial action appears just
and necessary.
97. See note 36 supra.
98. See note 25 supra.
99. It is doubtful whether the plaintiffs in Everett, Schwartz, and Thornwell would pass the discretionary
exception test employed in Note, From Feres to Stencel: Should Military Personnel Have Access to FTCA
Recovery?, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1099, 1123-25 (1979); see note 37 supra. The advantage of the failure to warn
approach is that it relies on established Feres principles rather than on the wholesale departure recommended by
many critics.
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have faithfully served in the military, and better allocates to government the
risk of those losses from military service. On balance, the morally just results
created by this theory override the shortcomings that it may have as a legal
theory distinguishable from the Feres doctrine.
V. CONCLUSION
The failure to warn inroad into intramilitary immunity comports with the
traditional tort law recognition that society holds certain nonfeasance morally
reprehensible.' ° The military ought to be held to some standard of care fol-
lowing the discharge of soldiers who have been forced to sacrifice various
liberties while in the military. While it is necessary for military discipline to
forego claims incident to service, individuals cannot be expected to forego
their right to prompt care and treatment when the military learns that it has
exposed persons in its service to harmful substances. On balance, it does not
appear unreasonable to impose a duty to warn on the military given the years
of faithful service by veterans and the needless pain and suffering that a
warning might alleviate.'0 ' At the very least, the expense should be distrib-
uted to society at large rather than placed on veterans or their survivors. The
words of Abraham Lincoln that are inscribed on the Veterans' Administration
building in Washington, D.C. are most appropriate: "We must care for those
who have borne the battle. . . ." 02
Thomas E. Szykowny
100. See text accompanying notes 57-59 supra.
101. See generally H. ROSENBERG, ATOMIC SOLDIERS (1980); Note, Radiation Injury and the Atomic
Veteran: Shifting the Burden of Proof on Factual Causation, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 933 (1981).
102. H. ROSENBERG, ATOMIC SOLDIERS 169 (1980). Rosenberg describes the frustrations encountered by
veterans who are unable to recover benefits from the Veterans' Administration for the effects of radiation. Id. at
174.
1982]



